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GATEKEEPING VS. BALANCING IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW OF ELECTIONS: METHODOLOGICAL UNCERTAINTY
ON THE HIGH COURT
Christopher S. Elmendorf & Edward B. Foley*
ABSTRACT
This Essay examines the methodological upheaval created by the quartet of
constitutional election law cases decided during October Term 2007. Prior to this
Term, the ascendant analytic approach called for a threshold characterization of the
burden on the plaintiff's rights, which characterization determined whether the court
would apply strict scrutiny or lax, rational-basis-like review. The characterization
was generally formal in nature. But in light of the Supreme Court's latest decisions,
it is now open to a lower court adjudicating a First Amendment or Equal Protection
challenge to an election law-absent a Supreme Court precedent squarely on point-
(1) to engage in unmediated, all-things-considered balancing, focusing either on the
overall reasonableness of the challenged law or on the reasonableness of exempting
or otherwise accommodating the plaintiff or plaintiff-class; (2) to apply strict scrutiny
after determining that the law (relative to some practicable alternative) has a large,
demonstrable adverse impact on voting, political association, or the competitiveness
of campaigns; (3) to apply strict scrutiny after identifying a facial attribute of the law
itself that renders it suspect in the judge's eye; (4) to apply extremely deferential re-
view because the law does not have attributes that the judge deems facially suspect
and because the judge is leery of getting bogged down in empirical debates or indulg-
ing in the guess work of open-ended balancing; or (5) to reject the claim after positing
that it raises questions about democratic fairness concerning which there is no dis-
cernable historical consensus. During October Term 2007, the Court vacillated among
these approaches, while providing precious little guidance to lower courts about the
circumstances that warrant one or another methodology. We suggest that the meth-
odological pluralism in these decisions, coupled with a lack of explicit normative
direction, may indicate that most Justices are approaching constitutional election law
thinking less about doctrinal coherence or interpretive principle than about the instru-
mental consequences of their rulings for the system of government as a whole.
* Elmendorf is Professor of Law, University of California at Davis. Foley is the Robert
M. Duncan/Jones Day Designated Professor of Law at the Moritz College of Law of the
Ohio State University, where he also serves as the Director of the Election Law @ Moritz
program.
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INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court has long thought that election law constitutes a distinctive
constitutional domain, and that judge-made doctrine ought to account for the char-
acteristics that distinguish this domain from others. There has, of course, been con-
siderable evolution in what the Justices see as the domain's central distinguishing
characteristics, and in what they understand to be the appropriate doctrinal response.
In Justice Frankfurter's day, the dominant concern was the risk that judicial inter-
ventions with respect to the ground rules of political competition would come to be
seen as partisan interventions, and that this would eviscerate the foundation of public
support upon which judicial authority ultimately rests.' For Frankfurter and his allies,
the appropriate response was to deem constitutional questions about the political pro-
cess nonjusticiable except insofar as the text of the Constitution or an independent
constitutional prohibition-one with more general applicability-makes avoidance
untenable.'
The Warren Court famously rejected Frankfurter's solution to the public percep-
tions problem and ushered in a new era.' The defining ideas were that the Constitution
protects unenumerated political rights, and that laws burdening the exercise of such
rights are presumptively unconstitutional and may be upheld only upon passing the
exacting test of justification known as "strict scrutiny."4
See, e.g., Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946).
2 See id.; see also Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 266-330 (1962) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting).
3 See Baker, 369 U.S. at 208-37.
The new paradigm was crisply articulated in Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist., 395
U.S. 621, 627-28 (1969).
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The next transformation occurred in the early 1970s.' The Court did not back-
track from the idea of a fundamental right to vote or a correlative right of ballot access
for candidates, but it significantly qualified the notion that state-created impediments
to the exercise of these rights are presumptively unconstitutional.6 Whereas the fact
or appearance of judicial partisanship was the animating concern in Frankfurter's era,
and political injustice was the Warren Court's dominant worry, the new era-which
we'll call the Storer era-was marked by an appreciation of the sheer pervasiveness
of election regulation, much of which seemed prima facie justifiable.7 As the Court
put it in Storer v. Brown, the case that gave official recognition to the new approach:
[A]s a practical matter, there must be a substantial regulation of
elections if they are to be fair and honest and if some sort of order,
rather than chaos, is to accompany the democratic processes....
[T]he States have evolved comprehensive, and in many respects
complex, election codes regulating in most substantial ways, with
respect to both federal and state elections, the time, place, and
manner of holding primary and general elections, the registration
and qualifications of voters, and the selection and qualification
of candidates.
It is very unlikely that all or even a large portion of the state
election laws would fail to pass muster under our cases; and the
rule fashioned by the Court to pass on constitutional challenges
to specific provisions of election laws provides no litmus-paper
test for separating those restrictions that are valid from those that
are invidious under the Equal Protection Clause. The rule is not
self-executing and is no substitute for the hard judgments that
must be made. Decision in this context, as in others, is very much
a "matter of degree," very much a matter of "considering the facts
and circumstances behind the law, the interests which the State
claims to be protecting, and the interests of those who are disad-
vantaged by the classification." What the result of this process
will be in any specific case may be very difficult to predict with
great assurance.8
The transitional cases include Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724 (1974); O'Brien v. Skinner,
414 U.S. 524 (1974); Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51 (1973); Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410
U.S. 752 (1973); Burns v. Fortson, 410 U.S. 686 (1973); and Marston v. Lewis, 410 U.S. 679
(1973).
6 See, e.g., Storer, 415 U.S. at 729.
7 Id. at 730.
' Id. (citations omitted).
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Storer engendered two further questions. First, what falls within Storer's domain?
Storer and its companion case, American Party of Texas v. White,9 concerned access
to the ballot by independent and third-party candidates. But Storer's language implies
that the balancing, "no litmus-paper" approach is properly employed in most any case
that touches upon a pervasively regulated component of the electoral process.'0 The
second question was whether judicial analysis under Storer would remain entirely
unstructured, with each claim rising or falling on the basis of the presiding judge's
own assessment of whether the restriction at issue simply goes too far, or whether
Storer is better read as an invitation for courts to develop a suite of gatekeeping precepts
(presumptions of constitutionality or unconstitutionality) that are sensitive to both
the presumed need for pervasive regulation of the electoral process and the presumed
impropriety of judicial usurpation of responsibility for writing those regulations.
In the years since 1973, the Supreme Court has demonstrated that Storer's domain
is very broad indeed. Ranging far beyond ballot access for third-party and independ-
ent candidates, the Court has applied the Storer framework (as modified by subsequent
decisions) to cases about major parties' freedom to structure their internal organization
and candidate nomination procedures as they see fit," to cases concerning adminis-
trative barriers to the casting of ballots, 2 to a ban on write-in voting,1 3 and to a case
about whether a partially non-electoral mechanism by which the major parties nom-
inate their candidates for certain offices is sufficiently open to upstart "challenger
candidates."' 4 The Justices have also borrowed the Storer balancing framework
9 415 U.S. 767 (1974).
10 See Storer, 415 U.S. at 730.
" See, e.g., Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 128 S. Ct. 1184 (2008)
(applying framework to the state's nominally nonpartisan "top 2" primary election, in which
candidates are allowed to list their party preference on the ballot, but political parties have
no commensurate right to list their candidate preferences); Clingman v. Beaver, 544 U.S. 581
(2005) (applying framework to state law banning political parties from inviting registered
members of other political parties to participate in the inviting party's primary election); Cal.
Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567 (2000) (applying framework to state's "blanket
primary," in which all voters participated in a single primary election to select both major
parties' nominees); Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351 (1997) (applying
framework to state law that banned political parties from selecting as their ballot-qualified
nominee a candidate who has agreed to appear on the ballot as another party's nominee); Eu
v. S.F. County Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214 (1989) (applying framework to state
laws regulating organization and governance of political parties); Tashjian v. Republican
Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208 (1986) (applying framework to state law banning political parties
from inviting registered independents to participate in the party's primary election).
12 See Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 128 S. Ct. 1610 (2008) (applying frame-
work to voter ID requirement); cf Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 1, 8 (2006) (suggesting in
passing that the framework should be employed in constitutional challenges to voter ID
requirements).
'" See Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428 (1992).
"4 See N.Y. State Bd. of Elections v. L6pez Torres, 128 S. Ct. 791 (2008).
[Vol. 17:507
THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF ELECTIONS
when undertaking to say whether the state has gone too far in restricting financial
contributions to political campaigns. 5 About the only subfield of election law char-
acterized by pervasive regulation that has not been assimilated into the Storer frame-
work is the design of electoral districts. (As the Court has struggled to come up with
a satisfactory test for separating permissible partisan gerrymanders from gerrymanders
that go too far, no Justice has sought guidance from Storer and its progeny.)
What then of the second question posed above, concerning the structure of
judicial analysis under Storer? Here the picture is more complicated-thanks in no
small part to the Supreme Court's decisions from this past Term. It will be helpful
at the outset to distinguish three modes of analysis, which we will call "unmediated
balancing," "rule-content gatekeeping," and "consequential gatekeeping." A judge
doing unmediated balancing simply makes an all-things-considered judgment call
about (1) whether the challenged law is in fact reasonable given the interests it pur-
portedly serves and the record before the court, or (2) whether the plaintiff's request
for an exemption or other accommodation is reasonable given the particular burdens
on her exercise of political process rights and the state's interest in including her within
the law's coverage. The gatekeeping alternatives, by contrast, involve threshold deter-
minations and associated presumptions about constitutionality. A judge doing rule-
content gatekeeping assigns a presumption of constitutionality or unconstitutionality
to the challenged requirements based on some feature that can be ascertained from
studying the legal requirements themselves, wholly apart from whatever consequences
they may have. A judge doing consequential gatekeeping assigns the presumption
based on record evidence of the requirements' impact. 16
Although Storer's "no litmus-paper" rhetoric cuts in favor of unmediated bal-
ancing, it could be said until very recently that the weight of opinion on the Supreme
Court was moving in the direction of rule-content gatekeeping."7 But this technique
1" See, e.g., Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 236-63 (2006) (Breyer, J., plurality
opinion); cf. Davis v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 128 S. Ct. 2759 (2008), discussed infra Part
II.D. For more on the assimilation of the Storer framework into campaign finance juris-
prudence, see Christopher S. Elmendorf, Structuring Judicial Review of Electoral Mechanics:
Explanations and Opportunities, 156 U. PA. L. REv. 313, 357-61 (2007) [hereinafter
Elmendorf, Structuring].
16 The gatekeeping approaches can be deployed with varying degrees of rigidity. To wit,
the definition of the gate itself can be sharp or fuzzy (contrast a hypothetical requirement that
voters not face "substantial" waiting times at the polls with a requirement that voters not be
required to wait for more than sixty minutes at the polls); the level of scrutiny applied to laws
on the "presumptively permissible" side of the gate can be "rubber stamp" rational basis or
some still deferential but not wholly uncritical standard; and, conversely, the level of scrutiny
applied to laws on the "presumptively impermissible" side of the gate may take the form of
fatal-in-fact strict scrutiny, or a somewhat less demanding type of proportionality analysis
that important, well tailored requirements can pass.
"7 See generally Elmendorf, Structuring, supra note 15 (analyzing standards of review
in electoral mechanics cases).
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was resoundingly rejected in two major election law cases from October Term 2007-
one adopting unmediated balancing; 8 the other going in the direction of consequential
gatekeeping. 9 Then again, two more election law cases from that Term speak to the
continuing attraction of rule-content gatekeeping.2 ° In all four of these cases, the
Justices purported to follow Storer and its progeny. In none did the Court offer a
reasoned explanation for its varying methodological choices, nor have individual
Justices acknowledged, let alone justified, their methodological flip-flopping from
case to case. The upshot for lower court judges who confront a novel question of law
in an election law case is that they may pick and choose among doctrinal strategies
virtually at will. There are no orienting precepts from the Supreme Court to guide
their decision.
Our objective in this Article is simply to show how the Court is vacillating among
analytic approaches. Identification of the problem comes before explanation and then
cure-lines of inquiry we intend to pursue in subsequent work. (This Article is one
installment in a larger project designed to improve the quality of election law in the
United States, particularly by reducing the taint of partisanship that has infected it in
recent years.) After charting the puzzling path of the Court's decisions, we will con-
clude with a few thoughts on possible explanations and the challenges that lay ahead.
I. FROM UNMEDIATED BALANCING TO RULE-CONTENT GATEKEEPING: SIGNS OF
CONVERGENCE
As we have noted, the Storer Court's rejection of "litmus-paper tests" and its
call for "hard judgments," the result of which in "any specific case may be very dif-
ficult to predict with great assurance,' sounds like a prescription for unmediated
balancing. Yet the decision in Storer is also plausibly read as establishing a conse-
quential gatekeeping regime specific to signature requirements for ballot access by
third-party and independent candidates. 22 Signature requirements, the Court indicated,
are generally permissible so long as "reasonably diligent" candidates are able to com-
ply with them.23 Going further, the Storer Court suggested that regulations which,
in effect, require the candidate to gather signatures from five percent or less of the
1" See Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 128 S. Ct. 1610 (2008), discussed infra
Part II.C.
9 See Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 128 S. Ct. 1184 (2008),
discussed infra Part II.B.
20 See N.Y. State Bd. Of Elections v. L6pez Torres, 128 S. Ct. 791 (2008), discussed
infra Part H.A.; Davis, 128 S. Ct. 2759 (2008), discussed infra Part II.D.
21 Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 730 (1974).
22 This reading of Storer and subsequent ballot-access cases is advanced in Elmendorf,
Structuring, supra note 15, at 345-53.
23 Storer, 415 U.S. at 742.
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"available pool" of eligible signatories are presumptively permissible, whereas
requirements of ten percent or more are presumptively unconstitutional.2 4
Although Storer's progeny can be mined for examples of unmediated balancing
(Anderson v. Celebrezze' is a good example), the gatekeeping model became ascen-
dant in the 1990s and 2000s. Burdick v. Takushi was the pivotal decision. 26 Looking
back at Storer and other decisions, the Burdick Court posited that judicial review in
cases about the mechanics of the electoral process actually involves two standards
of review: strict scrutiny for "severe" burdens on rights of political participation,
and a laxer balancing standard for "reasonable, nondiscriminatory" restrictions.27
The relaxed standard of review for non-severe burdens proved to be very lax indeed.
Although the Court never used the magic words "rational basis" to describe it, the
Court sustained every law it characterized as "non-severe" and used reasoning that
has the speculative air of ordinary rational basis analysis.28 Not surprisingly, some
lower courts equated lower Burdick with the rational basis standard.29
The Supreme Court in the Burdick era did not say much about the nature or pur-
pose of the threshold inquiry. The ordinary reader of the English language might sup-
pose that Burdick' s emphasis on burden severity required a functional/consequential
analysis. This interpretation also jibes with the Court's rhetoric in some 1970s-era
cases. 30 In practice, however, the Court generally drew distinctions based on the for-
mal content of the rule under consideration-and did so both pre- and post-Burdick,
until October Term 2007."'
For a sense of the pre-2007 nature of gatekeeping categorization, consider the
following examples:
32
Express Wealth-Related Conditions on Political Participation. The
Supreme Court has uniformly struck down express financial and property-
ownership conditions on participation in elections for national, state, and
24 Id. at 743-44.
25 460 U.S. 780 (1983).
26 504 U.S. 428 (1992).
27 Id. at 434 (quoting Anderson, 460 U.S. at 788).
28 On the standard of review for non-severe burdens under Burdick, see Elmendorf,
Structuring, supra note 15, at 330 n.66.
29 See, e.g., Werme v. Merrill, 84 F.3d 479,485 (1st Cir. 1996) (stating that the "defendants
need only show that the enactment of the regulation had a rational basis," given that the burden
at issue is "slight"); Common Cause/Ga. v. Billups, 504 F. Supp. 2d 1333, 1381 (N.D. Ga.
2007) ("[T]he appropriate inquiry is whether the Photo ID requirement is rationally related
to the interest the State seeks to further .... ").
" See, for example, the Court's discussion of the supposedly exclusionary effects of the
candidate filing fees struck down in Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 143-46 (1972), and
Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709, 717-18 (1974).
31 See Elmendorf, Structuring, supra note 15, at 335-80.
32 The following examples are drawn from (and elaborated in more detail in) Elmendorf,
Structuring, supra note 15.
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general-purpose local governments.33 It has never required an empirical
showing that such restrictions operate to disadvantage poor people.
The Court identifies the relevant threshold category on the basis of the
text of the law alone.
" "Direct" Regulation of the Organizational Structure of Political Parties.
In Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Central Committee, the
Court applied strict scrutiny to California's regulations of the internal
structure and governance of political parties.' The Court emphasized
that the state's requirements "directly implicate the associational rights
of political parties and their members."35 The "direct" nature of the
state's restrictions on party self-organization was enough to trigger
heightened scrutiny; the Court required no further showing that these
laws actually hindered the parties' ability to function effectively.
• Opening of Party Primaries to Non-members. In California Democratic
Party v. Jones, the Court held that California severely burdened political
parties' associational rights by requiring that a party's ballot-qualified
nominee be selected through a blanket primary open to all voters (not just
party members and party invitees). 36 The lower court had found the bur-
den not severe, relying on record evidence of the requirement's practical
impact on the nomination process.37 The Supreme Court downplayed
record evidence and emphasized instead the purpose behind the blanket
primary (nominating centrist candidates), and the fact that primary voters
were not required formally to affiliate with a party by even so modest
an act as opting to participate in the primary election of one party rather
than another.38
" Fusion Bans. In Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, the Court
upheld Minnesota's ban on fusion candidacies (wherein the same candi-
date appears on the ballot as the nominee of two political parties).3 9 A
minor party challenged the ban. The Eighth Circuit, relying on historical
evidence of the relative success of third parties in fusion-allowing and
fusion-disallowing jurisdictions, held that the ban "severely" burdened
third-party associational rights.4° The Supreme Court disagreed, deeming
33 See, e.g., Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (striking down the use
of poll taxes in state elections).
34 489 U.S. 214, 222, 225-29 (1989).
15 Id. at 229.
36 530 U.S. 567, 586 (2000).
" Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 984 F. Supp. 1288, 1297-1300 (E.D. Cal. 1997), rev'd,
530 U.S. 567 (2000).
38 Cal. Democratic Party, 530 U.S. at 577, 584.
'9 520 U.S. 351 (1997).
4o Twin Cities Area New Party v. McKenna, 73 F.3d 196, 197-99 (8th Cir. 1996), rev'd
sub nom. Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351 (1997).
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the burden "not severe" because it did not regulate the plaintiff party's
internal affairs and because it applied equally to all political parties, leav-
ing them on (formally) equal footing to compete for candidates.4' The
Court treated evidence of the ban's impact on third-party flourishing as
essentially irrelevant to the burden inquiry.42
State/Local Disparities in Signature Requirements for Ballot Access.
In Norman v. Reed, the Court applied strict scrutiny to a signature re-
quirement for local elective office that was in excess of analogous re-
quirements for statewide races-even though both fall below the five
percent cutoff that Storer indicated was generally permissible.43
* "Outlier" Campaign Contribution Limits. Justice Breyer's plurality
opinion in Randall v. Sorrell," joined by Justices Roberts and Alito, sug-
gests that the constitutionality of campaign contribution depends upon
a weighing of (1) the burden of the law on constitutionally protected
interests in "political association" and "political expression",;45 (2) the
risk of harm to "democratic accountability" (in the event that the contri-
bution limits "prevent[] challengers from mounting effective campaigns
against incumbent officeholders"); 46 and (3) the benefits of the law in
"preventing corruption and the appearance of corruption.,' ' This is,
of course, a classic prescription for unmediated balancing. But Justice
Breyer further proposed that courts generally should defer to legislatures'
judgments about how to balance the values at stake.4" An "independent"
judicial inquiry into the "proportionality of the restrictions" would,
however, be warranted whenever there are "danger signs, that.., risks
[to the democratic process] exist (both present in kind and likely serious
in degree)."'' 9 In Randall, Breyer found such a danger sign in the fact that
Vermont's contribution limits were the lowest in the nation, and lower
than any the Court had previously sustained.50 Although Breyer' s "danger
signs" approach leaves more play in the joints than some of the Court's
other gatekeeping tests (e.g., express monetary conditions on political
participation), it also bears the hallmark of rule-content gatekeeping, at
least as applied in Randall, because it involves classifying statutes on
the basis of their text.
' Timmons, 520 U.S. at 361-63.
42 Id. at 361-62.
43 502 U.S. 279, 295 (1992); see Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 744 (1974).
548 U.S. 230 (2006).
45 Id. at 241, 246 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 15 (1976)).
46 Id. at 248-49.
41 Id. at 248.
48 Id.
49 Id. at 249.
50 Id. at 249-51.
20081
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
One must be careful not to overstate the convergence hypothesis. The Court
never said that the threshold inquiry should focus on burden "character" rather than
"magnitude,"'" and the Court never repudiated the functionalist rhetoric of several
cases in the Storer line. Some Justices continued to call for functional approaches.
For example, Justice O'Connor (joined by Justice Breyer) wrote a concurring opinion
in 2005 in which she argued that judges should try to evaluate the practical, interac-
tive effects of electoral regulations when gauging burden severity under Burdick.12
Importantly, no Justice undertook to explain the Burdick threshold inquiry with
reference to the "political question" concerns that animated the decision in Vieth v.
Jubelirer, the partisan gerrymandering case.13 In Vieth, Justice Scalia (writing for
a four-Justice plurality) treated partisan gerrymandering claims as nonjusticiable for
want of an adequately constraining legal standard. 4 Justice Kennedy's concurrence
left open the possibility of discovering a suitable standard in the future.55 Even so,
Justice Kennedy shared the plurality's fear of permitting the judiciary to invalidate
legislative maps based on nothing more than an impressionistic feeling that something
untoward was afoot.56 Both he and Scalia were quite frank in acknowledging that the
high political stakes of partisan gerrymandering litigation raises the bar for what con-
stitutes a "judicially manageable" standard, and that the manageability component
of the political question doctrine is bound up with the courts' maintenance of their
reputation for political neutrality. 7
One can imagine an account of the Burdick threshold inquiry that melds Frank-
furterian concerns for the fact or appearance of judicial partisanship (which live on
in the partisan gerrymandering cases); the Warren Court's commitment to judicially
5 The doctrine nominally requires consideration of burden, character, and magnitude.
See Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992) ("A court considering a challenge to a
state election law must weigh 'the character and magnitude of the asserted injury to the rights
protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments that the plaintiff seeks to vindicate' ...."
(quoting Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 789 (1983))).
52 Clingman v. Beaver, 544 U.S. 581, 605-08 (2005).
13 541 U.S. 267 (2004).
Id. at 281.
Kennedy voted to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim rather than on
justiciability grounds. Id. at 313 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
56 Id. at 307.
" Scalia argued that an open-ended judicial inquiry into the partisan fairness of redis-
tricting plans would not win "public acceptance," and indeed would likely bring "partisan
enmity... upon the courts." Id. at 291,301 (plurality opinion). Echoing Scalia, Kennedy wrote
that judicial merits rulings absent "rules to limit and confine judicial intervention" would
result in the courts "assuming political, not legal, responsibility for a process that often produces
ill will and distrust." Id. at 307 (Kennedy, J., concurring). For a thoughtful examination of
the light that Vieth sheds on the "manageable standards" component of the political question
doctrine, see Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Judicially Manageable Standards and Constitutional
Meaning, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1274, 1281-97 (2006).
[Vol. 17:507
THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF ELECTIONS
enforceable rights of voting and political association; and the Burger Court's appre-
ciation for the pervasively regulated character of the electoral process. 8 In this view,
judges ought not to back out of the electoral arena altogether, as Frankfurter wanted,
lest protections for the basic political rights that legitimize the exercise of state power
be left to lawmakers who have incentives to jigger the rules of electoral competition
to entrench their hold on power.5 9 At the same time, judicial orders in election cases
must be guided by very clear rules so that judges can rebut the accusation that they
are playing favorites among candidates or political parties. ° In addition, the guiding
rules must be narrowly drawn, leaving most of the edifice of election regulation un-
scathed, so that the courts do not ossify election law or usurp the proper, constitu-
tionally conferred roles of the state and national legislatures in regulating the electoral
process.61 Burdick can be seen as an attempt to thread the needle, licensing a protec-
tive judicial role but requiring judges to identify a characteristic of the challenged
requirement that renders it uniquely suspect and unlike run-of-the-mill election regu-
lations before applying heightened scrutiny. 62 In this light, Vieth can be seen as con-
tributing to the apparent convergence toward vigilant gatekeeping as the Court's basic
methodological instinct in all areas of election law, even if the Court did not fully
articulate its reasons for this apparent convergence.
II. THE CONTRADICTORY TEACHINGS OF OCTOBER TERM 2007
Observers had cause to hope that this past Term would bring new clarity to the
Court's election law jurisprudence. Justice Alito had replaced the ever-unpredictable
O'Connor, and the Court was to hear three electoral mechanics cases, and a fourth
case concerning campaign contribution limits. The Court's grants of certiorari evinced
an eagerness to wrestle with new issues, such as constitutional challenges to voter ID
requirements, which had just started to reach the circuit courts.6 3 It Was anticipated in
some quarters that the Court would use the pending cases to give definitive guidance
to the lower courts in advance of the 2008 elections.' That hope was not realized.
About the only thing that the Term clarified was that there exists a remarkable
58 For an elaboration of this idea, see Elmendorf, Structuring, supra note 15, at 327-34.
19 Id. at 328.
' See id. at 334.
61 Id. at 328-29.
62 For an account of Burdick along these lines, see Elmendorf, Structuring, supra note 15.
63 At the time of the certiorari grant in Crawford, the Seventh Circuit was the only circuit
court to have reached the merits of a constitutional challenge to a photo-ID-for-voting require-
ment. See Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 472 F.3d 949 (7th Cir. 2007), affid, 128 S.
Ct. 1610 (2008). Constitutional attacks on similar photo ID requirements were working their
way through the state and lower federal courts in Georgia, Arizona, Michigan, and New Mexico.
' See, e.g., Edward B. Foley, Crawford v. Marion County Election Board: VoterlD, 5-4?
If So, So What?, 7 ELECTION L. J. 63 (2008).
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diversity of analytic methods available to the judge who has been called upon to say
whether a particular regulation of a pervasively regulated component of the electoral
process goes too far. It remains for the Court to explain what circumstances justify
the use of one or another of these analytic methods.
A. New York Board of Elections v. L6pez Torres: A Link to Vieth?
The Court's decision in the first of the four cases, New York Board of Elections
v. L6pez Torres, provided important and indeed novel support for the hypothesis that
the model of rule-content gatekeeping is ascendant.65 Lpez Torres presented a con-
stitutional challenge to New York's peculiar hybrid regime of primary elections and
nominating conventions for selecting major-party candidates for trial judgeships. The
plaintiff argued (and the lower courts agreed) that New York's system was unconsti-
tutional because it did not afford candidates disfavored by the party leadership a fair
shot in competing for their party's nomination. The Supreme Court, per Justice
Scalia, answered:
What constitutes a "fair shot" is a reasonable enough question
for legislative judgment, which we will accept so long as it does
not too much infringe upon the party's associational rights. But
it is hardly a manageable constitutional question for judges-
especially for judges in our legal system, where traditional elec-
toral practice gives no hint of even the existence, much less the
content, of a constitutional requirement for a "fair shot" at party
nomination.6
Accordingly, the Court ruled categorically that candidates cannot win this sort of con-
stitutional challenge to state laws governing political party nomination procedures
(a kind of claim distinguishable from those brought by a party itself on the ground that
state law interferes with its operations). 67
The quoted passage is the first explicit, Vieth-like invocation of political question
concerns to appear in a case involving, not political gerrymandering, but an issue of
ballot access or any other subject governed by the Storer-Burdick framework.68 To be
sure, the fact that Justice Scalia, the Court's arch-formalist, authored both the Vieth
plurality and L6pez Torres goes a long way toward explaining why the two sound
similar. But Scalia's disavowal of unstructured fairness inquiries in L6pez Torres was
65 128 S. Ct. 791 (2008).
' Id. at 799 (emphasis added).
67 Id. at 801. For an example of the latter, see Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S.
567 (2000).
' See supra text accompanying note 65.
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questioned by only one of his colleagues. (Justice Kennedy concurred in the judg-
ment while suggesting that the plaintiff's fair-shot argument would have presented
a serious constitutional question had New York not provided an easy way for inde-
pendent candidates to gain access to the general election ballot.69) As such, Ldpez-
Torres lays another piece of the foundation for an opinion that would confirm the gate-
keeping nature of the Burdickjurisprudence and, going further, that would direct the
lower courts not to adjudicate constitutional questions about the fairness of the elec-
toral process absent a very constraining legal standard.
B. Washington State Grange v. Washington State Republican Party: A New
Dawn for Consequential Gatekeeping?
With the next case down the pike, Washington State Grange v. Washington State
Republican Party, the Court took a big step back from rule-content gatekeeping-
albeit without rejecting the gatekeeping model altogether. 70 At issue was a facial, pre-
implementation challenge to Washington's "top two" regime of primary elections. 7|
Under this regime, all ballot-qualified candidates appear on a single primary ballot.72
All voters participate in the primary, without regard to their party affiliation.73 The top
two vote-getters in the primary move on to the general election.74 Each candidate may
designate his or her "party preference" on the ballot; political parties, however, are not
entitled to state on the ballot whether they endorse the candidates who so affiliate with
them.75 The state Republican Party argued that this arrangement unconstitutionally
burdened its associational rights.76
The Party lost, and so did the model of rule-content gatekeeping. Justice Scalia,
joined only by Justice Kennedy, penned a dissent arguing that the state's decision to
give candidates an opportunity to affiliate with a political party on the ballot, without
giving political parties a commensurate right to denote their acceptance or rejection
of the candidate, constituted a "severe burden" on the parties' associational rights and
must therefore face strict scrutiny.77 Notice the essential hallmark of rule-content
gatekeeping in Scalia's reasoning: readily observed attributes of the statute are being
used to classify it as presumptively permissible or impermissible without regard to
whether the statute actually has the effect of substantially burdening a privileged right
or aspect of democratic performance.7 8
69 L6pez Torres, 128 S. Ct. at 801-03 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
70 128 S. Ct. 1184 (2008).
71 Id. at 1189.
72 id.
73 Id.
74 Id. at 1187.
75 Id. at 1189.
76 Id.
77 Id. at 1197-1203 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
78 IA
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Justice Thomas, writing for a seven-Justice majority, answered the plaintiff's (and
Scalia' s) argument by saying, in effect, show me the evidence. If the Party were to
prove that voters "will misinterpret the party-preference designation," and if the
resulting confusion would burden severely the Party's efforts to define and commu-
nicate its identity to the public, the primary-election law would properly be subject
to exacting judicial scrutiny.79 But as the case came before the Court, the existence
and degree of voter confusion was "sheer speculation," and so the Party's facial chal-
lenge had to be rejected if it was conceivable that the state would implement the top-
two primary in a manner that did not generate "widespread voter confusion" about the
meaning of the party-preference designations.8° Chief Justice Roberts, joined by
Justice Alito, added a concurring opinion to explain his view that plaintiffs need not
"produce studies regarding voter perceptions."'', All that is needed, Roberts indi-
cated, is enough concrete evidence concerning ballot design and the practice of party-
preference designation to convince the Court that hypothetically reasonable voters
will misinterpret party-preference designations as endorsements by a party. 82 That
Roberts had to write separately to make this point, and that he was joined only by
Alito, suggests that the other five Justices in the majority were ready to contemplate
(if not yet committed to) a legal standard that would require plaintiffs to come for-
ward with social-scientific proof of "widespread voter confusion. 83
Justice Thomas's opinion in Washington Grange can be seen as a tentative first
step toward consequential gatekeeping at step one of the Burdick analysis. Under this
approach, the Court would articulate a conception of the good of voting, districting,
and the like, and rely on social scientists to come up with ways of measuring the con-
sequences of challenged enactments vis-a-vis the privileged democratic value.8' (In
Washington Grange, the privileged value was an informed electorate.) With a suitable
metric in hand, the Court could set standards that the states would be required to meet
on pain of having their election laws strictly scrutinized and reformed under court
order. A state that falls short of the standard would be said to have "severely" bur-
dened rights of political participation.85
The nearest precedent for the Court's opinion in Washington Grange is Storer
itself. There, the Court set forth a "reasonably diligent candidate" standard for evalu-
ating ballot-access restrictions and allowed that "[p]ast experience will be a helpful,
if not always an unerring, guide: it will be one thing if independent candidates have
19 Id. at 1193-95 (majority opinion).
80 Id. at 1193-94.
"' Id. at 1196-97 (Roberts, J., concurring).
82 id.
83 Id. at 1194 (majority opinion).
The Court would also need to come up with a doctrinal rubric for defining a benchmark
alternative to the challenged requirements because the consequences of a regulatory regime
can only be measured vis-A-vis some regulatory alternative.
85 Washington Grange, 128 S. Ct. at 1192, 1196.
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qualified with some regularity and quite a different matter if they have not."86 But in
the thirty-five years since Storer, the Court has not elaborated on the kind of outcome-
based showing that could establish that a ballot-access regime is so restrictive as to
be presumptively unconstitutional. And in other electoral mechanics cases, majority
coalitions on the Court have been reluctant to tie scrutiny levels to the actual conse-
quences of challenged requirements for voters, candidates, political parties, or the
electoral system as a whole.87
The Court's unease about using performance standards to solve the "goes too
far" problem is also revealed in its latest partisan gerrymandering case, League of
United Latin American Citizens v. Perry (LULAC).88 As noted above, Kennedy, in
Vieth, voiced doubt about ever finding a constraining standard by which to judge parti-
san excess in redistricting. 89 Leading political scientists Gary King, Bernard Grofman,
Andrew Gelman, and Jonathan Katz tried to answer Kennedy's concerns by filing an
anicus brief in LULAC in which they explained how social scientists use a "symmetry
standard" to measure the degree of partisan advantage built into a districting map.90
A map is symmetrical insofar as each party would gain the same number of seats as
a result of achieving the same percentage of statewide votes.9' For example, suppose
that in a 100-member legislature the Democrats secure sixty seats from achieving only
fifty-five percent of the statewide vote; while that might seem a sort of bias in favor
of Democrats, it would not be if Republicans would also secure sixty seats if they
achieved fifty-five percent of the votes. In this situation, although the map would give
the statewide majority party a boost in securing control of the legislature, this boost
would be equally available to both parties and the map is in this sense "symmetrical."
By contrast, a map would be asymmetrical in favor of the Democrats if winning a
fifty-five percent statewide majority would give them 60 seats notwithstanding that
a fifty-five/forty-five statewide margin for Republicans would earn the Republicans
only fifty-eight seats.
86 Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 742 (1974).
87 For example, in Munro v. Socialist Workers Party, 479 U.S. 189 (1986), Timmons v.
Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351 (1997), and Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530
U.S. 567 (2000), the Supreme Court issued rule-bound decisions that reversed lower court
rulings that had focused on the practical consequences of the challenged requirements. See
also Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230 (2006), in which the plurality applied elevated scrutiny
after finding "danger signs" (but little empirical evidence) of a serious threat to political com-
petition. Justice Souter, dissenting in Randall, would have conditioned heightened scrutiny
on a showing of actual and serious harm to political competition, not mere "danger signs."
See id. at 286-88.
88 548 U.S. 399 (2006).
89 Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 306-17 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
9 See Brief of Amici Curiae Professors Gary King, Bernard Grofman, Andrew Gelman,
& Jonathan N. Katz, in Support of Neither Party, LULAC, 548 U.S. 399 (2006) (Nos. 05-204,
05-254, 05-276, 05-439).
9' Id. at4-5.
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Justice Kennedy found the symmetry standard intriguing, even helpful, but he
was not prepared to commit to it in LULAC.92 He did not see a basis, he said, "for
deciding how much partisan dominance is too much. 93 The act of picking a cutoff
out of the blue evidently struck him as incongruent with the judicial role.94 And given
that four other Justices saw nothing in LULAC that led them to question Vieth's pro-
visional justiciability holding, Kennedy's resistance to firm consequential gatekeeping
amounts to resistance from the heart of the Court.
95
92 LULAC, 548 U.S. at 420.
93 Id.
4 Justice Stevens, in dissent, was prepared to say that any degree of asymmetry beyond
ten percent would be "too much." See id. at 467-68, 473 n. 11 (Stevens, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
9' One of the authors of this Article (Foley) has thought that the solution to Justice
Kennedy's conundrum is to combine the symmetry standard with a test that identifies when
partisan gerrymandering thwarts the will of the majority. In LULAC, Kennedy said that
"asymmetry alone is not a reliable measure of unconstitutional partisanship." Id. at 420
(Kennedy, J., concurring). He said something similar in Vieth about evidence that one party
is able to maintain a majority of seats in the legislature even without majority support from
voters. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 308 (Kennedy, J., concurring). But even if either inquiry alone is
insufficient, it is possible that both-together-provide an appropriate test to identify uncon-
stitutional partisan gerrymanders. Indeed, combining both makes sense in terms of underlying
constitutional principles: the evil to be avoided is when one party draws a map that enables
it to retain power over the legislature even when it has lost majority support of the voters, but
(asymmetrically) the other party would not be able to obtain majority control of the legislature
with the exact same level of minority voter support.
Foley's solution solves the "how much is too much" problem by positing that any
asymmetry is presumptively unconstitutional if certain other qualitative conditions are met
(e.g., the party favored by the gerrymander wins a majority of seats in the legislature with a
minority of the popular vote, and the other party likely would not have won a majority of
seats with the same vote share). This arguably is in some tension with the Burdick "severe/
lesser burden" framework, which the Court has applied in most electoral mechanics cases
(partisan gerrymandering excepted), because the Burdick framework generally tolerates bur-
dens on constitutionally protected interests so long as the burden is not "severe." Is there a
severe representational injury if, for example, (1) a party that wins 49% of the popular vote
ends up with 51% of the seats in the legislature, and (2) the other party most likely would have
won only 49% of the seats if it had garnered a 49% share of the popular vote? For better or
worse, the Burdick framework seems to invite "arbitrary" line drawing if implemented through
firm performance standards. Of course, that quality is not necessarily something favorable
about the Burdick approach.
It might be argued, however, that the purpose of the Burdick threshold inquiry is to avoid
"excessive" judicial involvement in the political process, and that other approaches are per-
missible if they would usefully simplify, regularize, and limit judicial involvement. Foley's
partisan gerrymandering solution might be defended in this way, much like the Court's deci-
sion in Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725 (1983) (declining to recognize a safe harbor for mal-
apportionment claims). Foley's standard could also be narrowed in other ways, without numer-
ical cutoffs. For example, plaintiffs might be required to show that the challenged asymmetric
map not only frustrates majority rule, but also is inferior to the predecessor map in terms of
traditional districting criteria.
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C. Crawford v. Marion County Election Board: The End of Gatekeeping?
A few months after Washington Grange, the Supreme Court announced its decision
in Crawford v. Marion County Election Board,96 a facial challenge brought by the state
Democratic Party against Indiana's novel photo ID requirement for voting. The law
at issue was enacted on a straight party-line vote of the legislature and was derided by
critics (including a Seventh Circuit judge) as a "not-too-thinly-veiled attempt to dis-
courage election-day turnout by certain folks believed to skew Democratic. 97 A frac-
tured Supreme Court rejected the plaintiffs' challenge but was unable to chart a clear
path for voting administration cases going forward.
Crawford is nonetheless an extremely important case, for the Justices engaged one
another for the first time in an overt debate over the nature of the Burdick analysis.8
Justice Scalia, joined this time by Justices Thomas and Alito, continued to beat the
drum for formalism. Burdick and subsequent cases, he wrote, "forged Anderson's
amorphous 'flexible standard' into something resembling an administrable rule,"
with strict scrutiny applied to laws that "severely" burden political rights and very lax
review extended to all other challenged requirements." In gauging burden severity,
he explained, a court ought not to make a "record-based" inquiry into the challenged
requirement's practical consequences for individuals who wish to vote,'0° but should
instead make an overall assessment of whether the requirement goes beyond "the
merely inconvenient. ' ' Lest anyone mistake this as licensing fact-specific inquiries
into the "convenience" of voting requirements, Justice Scalia also referenced an
earlier opinion by Justice Thomas stating that "ordinary and widespread" require-
ments should not be deemed severe.'0 2
Strikingly, six Justices expressly rejected Scalia's two-tiered and formalist gloss
on Burdick. Justice Stevens, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Kennedy,
insisted that Burdick did not in any way alter the "no litmus test" balancing rubric of
Storer and Anderson.'0 3 Much to our surprise, he read the seminal case of Harper v.
Virginia Board of Elections'04 as standing not for the proposition that express mone-
tary conditions on voting are per-se severe, but rather for the principle that "[h]owever
slight [a] burden may appear.., it must be justified by relevant and legitimate state
96 128 S. Ct. 1610 (2008).
9' Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 472 F.3d 949,954 (7th Cir. 2007) (Evans, J.,
dissenting), affd, 128 S. Ct. 1610 (2008).
98 Id. at 128 S. Ct. 1610, 1616 n.8, 1624, 1627-28.
99 Id. at 1624 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citing Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428,434 (1992)).
'0 Id. at 1627.
'0 Id. at 1624-25.
'02 Id. at 1624 (citing Clingman v. Beaver, 544 U.S. 581, 591, 593-97 (2005)).
'03 Id. at 1616 & n.8.
'04 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
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interests 'sufficiently weighty to justify the limitation."' 0 5 Justices Souter (joined by
Justice Ginsburg) and Breyer dissented from the Court's decision to uphold the Indiana
photo ID requirement, but in doing so they stated their agreement with Stevens's (rather
than Scalia's) formulation of the applicable legal standard.' 06 In a small irony, Justice
Breyer wrote that the balancing test applied to voting requirements was the same as
the balancing test applied to campaign contribution restrictions, 7 yet he paid no heed
to the gatekeeping principle he had enunciated just two years earlier in Randall-
namely, that courts should defer to the legislature's striking of the balance absent
objective "danger signs" that the lawmakers got it badly wrong.'08
Time will tell whether Crawford ushers in a new era of unmediated balancing.
To the extent that it does, the Justices who favor balancing-with-bite will have to
resolve a question that divided them in Crawford: whether the balancing should be
aggregative or granular in nature-i.e., whether the Court should consider the
totality of the challenged requirement's impacts or only its impact upon the plaintiff-
voters, in the case at hand. 1' In Crawford, Justice Stevens, joined by Kennedy and
105 Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1616 (citations omitted). Contra Elmendorf, Structuring, supra
note 15, at 341-42 (treating Harper as a case involving burdens "severe in kind"). It might
not be so surprising that Justice Stevens, were he writing a concurrence solely for himself,
would take this view in favor of a no-threshold-whatsoever approach to Burdick balancing.
See Andrew M. Siegel, Equal Protection Unmodified: Justice John Paul Stevens and the Case
for Unmediated Constitutional Interpretation, 74 FORDHAM L. REv. 2339 (2006). But insofar
as Justice Stevens was given the assignment by the Chief Justice to write an opinion with the
expectation that it would be joined by a majority or plurality of the Justices, it is indeed surpris-
ing that Justice Stevens would attempt such an aggressively revisionist account of Burdick.
Alternatively, if Justice Stevens had announced at the Court's conference on Crawford that
he could not abide by a gatekeeping application of Burdick, then what becomes surprising is
Chief Justice Roberts's willingness to assign Justice Stevens the opinion.
'06 See Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1628 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("Given the legitimacy of
interests on both sides, we have avoided pre-set levels of scrutiny [in electoral mechanics
cases] in favor of a sliding-scale balancing analysis: the scrutiny varies with the effect of the
regulation at issue. And whatever the claim, the Court has long made a careful, ground-level
appraisal both of the practical burdens on the right to vote and of the State's reasons for im-
posing those precise burdens."); id. at 1643 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("I would balance the
voting-related interests that the statute affects, asking 'whether the statute burdens any one
such interest in a manner out of proportion to the statute's salutary effects upon the others
(perhaps, but not necessarily, because of the existence of a clearly superior, less restrictive
alternative)."' (quoting Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 402 (2000))).
'0o See id. (citing campaign finance cases for the standard of review).
'08 See Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 249 (2006).
'" This distinction between aggregative and granular balancing bears some resemblance
to the familiar distinction between facial and as-applied challenges. But these two distinctions
need not be the same analytically. On one understanding, the facial/as-applied distinction is
an aspect of standing law, concerning what plaintiff is entitled to challenge a law as being
unconstitutional. The aggregative/granular distinction concerns how to evaluate whether a
law is in whole or in part unconstitutional.
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Roberts, suggested that burdens should be gauged from the point of view of particu-
lar affected voters." ° To the extent that a challenged requirement poses exceptional
difficulties for a given plaintiff-voter, the state will be hard pressed to justify its
failure to provide that voter with an exemption. Justices Souter and Breyer, by
contrast, undertook a global assessment of the Indiana law, weighing the total
number of adversely affected voters as well as the anticipated burden on each.l" It
is not clear from the Breyer and Souter opinions, however, whether they understood
this sort of global analysis to be merely an option which plaintiffs may elect (e.g.,
by pursuing a facial rather than an as-applied challenge), or instead as the exclusive
mode of balancing analysis under Burdick.
D. Davis v. Federal Election Commission: Facial Gatekeeping Returns, Sub
Silentio?
The last of the election law cases decided during October Term 2007, Davis v.
Federal Election Commission,"2 struck down the so-called "Millionaire's Amendment"
to the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA)." 3 Justice Alito authored
the Court's opinion, writing for a five-Justice majority." 4 Ironically enough, his opin-
ion exemplifies rule-content gatekeeping-but without an overt acknowledgement
that this is what he was doing.
The Millionaire's Amendment trebled the otherwise applicable campaign contribu-
tion limit for candidates who face substantially self-funded opponents, and exempted
these candidates from the BCRA's restrictions on coordinated party expenditures." 5
It was challenged by Jack Davis, who had spent substantial sums of his own money on
previous, failed campaigns for the House of Representatives and who stated his intent
10 See Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1620-23 (looking at particular voters or classes of voters
for whom the ID requirement might represent a special burden).
". Id. at 1628 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("'[T]he rigorousness of our inquiry into the propriety
of a state election law depends upon the extent to which a challenged regulation burdens First
and Fourteenth Amendment rights' upon an assessment of the 'character and magnitude of
the asserted [threatened] injury' and an estimate of the number of voters likely to be affected."
(emphasis added) (citations omitted)); id. at 1644-45 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (weighing the
likely impact of the statute across all gamut of disproportionately affected voters). In that
their analysis was global or aggregative in character, the opinions of Breyer and Souter have
an important commonality with Scalia's, though they rejected Scalia's two-tiered reading of
Burdick and his aversion to record-based burden assessment.
12 128 S. Ct. 2759 (2008).
"1 The "Millionaire's Amendment," section 319(a) of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform
Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 109, is codified at 2 U.S.C. § 441a-l(a) (2008).
114 Davis, 128 S. Ct. 2759.
" 2 U.S.C. § 441a-l(a). For a straightforward explanation of the workings of the Amend-
ment, see Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 2765-67.
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to run again and spend more than $1 million of personal funds on his next race."' The
Court determined that the Millionaire's Amendment "imposes a substantial burden
on the exercise of the First Amendment right to use personal funds for campaign
speech," and that the "provision [therefore] cannot stand unless it is 'justified by a
compelling state interest."".. 7 The echo of Burdick's two-tiered, severe/lesser burden
approach is more than faint.
What marks Davis as a rule-content gatekeeping case is the analysis that leads to
the conclusion that the "burden" of the Millionaire's Amendment on First Amendment
rights is "substantial."" 8 The principal explanatory paragraph is all makeweight." 9
Alito declared that the Amendment "imposes an unprecedented penalty on any candi-
date who robustly exercises [his] First Amendment right."' 2° Candidates who none-
theless choose to "make large personal expenditures" in support of their campaigns
"shoulder a special and potentially significant burden.... [because] the vigorous exer-
cise of the right to use personal funds to finance campaign speech produces fundrais-
ing advantages for opponents... "' Notice what is missing here: any consideration
of the extent to which the Millionaire's Amendment discriminates in favor of non-
self-funding candidates. Nor is there any semblance of a Washington Grange-like
requirement that the plaintiff-candidate prove that the challenged provisions of the
BCRA, as implemented, practically and substantially interfere with his ability to get
his message across by spending his own funds.
To make sense of Justice Alito' s decision to apply strict scrutiny, one needs to
look beyond the paragraphs of the opinion in which he characterizes the substantiality
of the burden. The two most important lines are found elsewhere:
We have never upheld the constitutionality of a law that imposes
different contribution limits for candidates who are competing
against each other ....
Different candidates have different strengths. Some are wealthy;
others have wealthy supporters who are willing to make large
contributions. Some are celebrities; some have the benefit of a
well-known family name. Leveling electoral opportunities means
making and implementingjudgments about which strengths should
be permitted to contribute to the outcome of an election. The
Constitution, however, confers upon voters, not Congress, the
116 Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 2763.
117 Id. at 2772 (emphasis added) (quoting Fed. Election Comm'n v. Mass. Citizens for Life,
479 U.S. 238, 256 (1986)).
118 Id.
9 See id. at 2771-72.
120 Id. at 2771.
121 Id. at 2772.
[Vol. 17:507
THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF ELECTIONS
power to choose the Members of the House of Representatives,
Art. I, § 2, and it is a dangerous business for Congress to use the
election laws to influence the voters' choices. 22
We think these passages signify that the decision to apply strict scrutiny in Davis
really turned on the formal asymmetry of campaign contribution limits under the
Millionaire's Amendment, not their practical consequences for effective speech by
self-funders. The second passage adduces the reason that formal asymmetry triggers
strict scrutiny: because it is a danger sign that lawmakers have gotten dangerously
far into the business of "[1]eveling electoral opportunities."' 23 The underlying con-
cern is that lawmakers will seek to manipulate voters' choices in furtherance of law-
makers' electoral self-interest or partisan agendas, rather than to help voters effectuate
their own political preferences. That a campaign finance law discriminates on its face
against a class of candidates is some indication that the law was designed to serve the
electoral or partisan interests of those who wrote it, rather than to combat corruption,
to improve voters' access to information, or to advance some other permissible end.
What muddies our facial gatekeeping reading of Davis is that Justice Alito did
not reference Justice Breyer's "danger signs" analysis in Randall,24 the Court's then-
most-recent encounter with campaign contribution limits and the case in which the
plurality, per Breyer (joined by Alito), said that heightened scrutiny of campaign con-
tribution limits is justified if there are "danger signs" that the limits at issue are not
reasonably tailored to advance important state interests. Nor did Justice Breyer join
Alito's opinion in Davis, or concur separately to further elaborate the danger-signs
model, or write a dissent identifying an error in Alito's implicit rule-content gatekeep-
ing reasoning. Rather, Breyer joined Justice Stevens's dissent, an opinion which is
insensitive to the structural, electoral competition values that Breyer had tried to
protect using the danger-signs method in Randall.125 Davis thus suggests a certain
judicial discomfort with acknowledging what one of us has argued is the underlying
logic of most of the Burdick jurisprudence-namely, that in characterizing burdens
for level-of-scrutiny purposes, the Justices are really seeking to identify simple,
generalizable indicators of the likelihood that the restriction at issue is or is not all-
things-considered justified. 6
122 Id. at 2771, 2774 (emphasis added).
123 Id.
124 Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 249 (2006).
"z Stevens's dissent turns on the proposition that the Millionaire's Amendment is unprob-
lematic because its "amplification [of the speech of the opponent of a self-funding candidate] in
no way mutes the voice of the millionaire." Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 2780 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
This is empirically questionable, and, perhaps more to the point, is insensitive to the risk that
facially discriminatory regulations of campaign speech will be used to gravely hamstring
political communication by candidates whom incumbent lawmakers disfavor. See Posting
of Rick Pildes to Balkinization, http://balEn.blogspot.comV2008/06/sympathy-for-millionaire
-self.html (June 26, 2008, 11:37 EST).
126 See Elmendorf, Structuring, supra note 15, at 324-25.
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E. Conclusions
As things stand today, the "law" that has emerged from Storer and Burdick is
almost impossibly open-ended. Facing a constitutional challenge to an unfamiliar
election law, a judge could choose to perform unmediated granular balancing (citing
the Crawford plurality); 12 7 engage in unmediated aggregative balancing (citing Storer,
Anderson, and the Crawford dissenters and concurrence); 2 ' dismiss the case because
the plaintiffs failed to come forward with empirical proof of a substantial burden on
rights or injury to a privileged democratic value (citing Washington Grange);29 apply
strict scrutiny after identifying a qualitative aspect of the law that, in the judge's view,
renders it highly suspect (citing Davis, Jones, Eu, Lubin, and Harper);130 or dismiss
the case after characterizing the plaintiffs' attack as one that raises questions about
political fairness, that are not judicially manageable (citing L6pez Torres and Vieth).131
Except insofar as the law and claim at issue are close to being "on all fours" with
one that a Supreme Court majority has resolved in a particular way' 32-itself a rare
thing in this domain-our judge will find little if anything in Supreme Court precedent
to guide the choice among these approaches. The Court has provided no overarching
account of why it proceeds in different ways in these cases, notwithstanding that each
case purports to apply the same doctrinal framework.
Not only do the Supreme Court's decisions leave judges with massive discretion
to pick and choose among doctrinal approaches, they also offer precious little norma-
tive guidance about the goals thatjudges should pursue in disposing of the cases be-
fore them. As other scholars have explained at length, the Supreme Court has long
disavowed having any "theory of democracy" upon which to rest its constitutional
election law jurisprudence. 33 When defining political rights, the Court has often
given justifications that are either declarative and question-begging, " or so abstract
127 See supra Part H.C.
128 See supra notes 98-108 and accompanying text.
129 See supra Part II.B.
130 See supra Part II.D, notes 30, 34-37, 104-06 and accompanying text.
131 See supra Part II.A.
132 For example, if the law concerns ballot notations and the claim is that the notation
regime will infringe on a political party's ability to define and communicate its message, then
Washington Grange presumably governs.
133 See, e.g., Heather K. Gerken, The Costs and Causes of Minimalism in Voting Cases:
Baker v. CarrandIts Progeny, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1411 (2002); Daniel R. Ortiz, Got Theory?, 153
U. PA. L. REv. 459 (2004).
's Some quick examples:
In Harper v. Virginia State Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966), the Court struck
down the poll tax after declaring that "[vioter qualifications have no relation to wealth nor
to paying or not paying this or any other tax," id. at 666, but this begs the question of whether
payment of a poll tax is nonetheless a tenable proxy for knowledge & commitment, which
assuredly does have a "relation to [normative] voting." Id. at 670.
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as to provide doubtful practical guidance to lower courts.1 35 Conversely, the Court
has often rejected constitutional challenges to the ground rules of political competition
on the basis of state interests in "stability" and "order," whose relationship to the
challenged law is speculative at best. 1
36
All this leads to three questions. First, what accounts for the scattershot nature
of the election law cases-the cycling among doctrinal approaches, and the lack of
overarching normative direction? Second, does the scattershot nature of this body
of law have adverse consequences beyond the lack of guidance for regulators and liti-
gants? And if so, third, what can be done about it? These questions lie beyond the
scope of this Article; they are grist for our future work. But before closing this piece,
we will offer a few preliminary thoughts with an eye toward explanation.
11. UNDERSTANDING METHODOLOGICAL PLURALISM: SOME PRELIMINARY
THOUGHTS
Lrpez Torres, Washington Grange, Crawford, and Davis nominally apply the
same doctrinal framework, yet do so in extremely different ways.137 What accounts
for the unexplained plurality of approaches traveling under the same doctrinal flag?
In Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993), and subsequent cases, the Court struck down funny
looking racial gerrymanders on the theory that such districts send a "message" to elected
representatives that their "primary obligation is to represent only the members of f the racial
group that predominates in the district], rather than their constituency as a whole." Id. at 648.
The Court provided no evidence for the empirically questionable proposition that the shape
of an electoral district, or even the intent behind its creation, affects the likelihood that the
elected representative will attend to the interests of political minorities within the district.
And in the seminal case of Reynolds v. Sims, the Court declared that "[t]o the extent that
a citizen's right to vote is debased [because he resides in a district with more voters than
others], he is that much less a citizen." 377 U.S. 533, 567 (1964). Again, the Court provided
no evidence for this asserted dignitary harm, nor did it bother trying to answer Justice Stewart's
quip (dissenting in Reynolds's companion case): "I find it impossible to understand how or
why a voter in California, for instance, either feels or is less a citizen than a voter in Nevada,
simply because, despite their population disparities, each of those States is represented by two
United States Senators." Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Gen. Assembly of Colo., 377 U.S. 713, 746
(1964) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
"35 Thus, in the canonical explanation of the "fundamental" status of the right to vote, the
Court said only that the right was fundamental because it is "'preservative of other basic civil
and political rights,"' and because "[a]ny unjustified discrimination in determining who may
participate in political affairs or in the selection of public officials undermines the legitimacy
of representative government." Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 626
(1969) (quoting Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 562). Justifications offered at this level of generality pro-
vide little guidance to lower courts charged with fleshing out the right in new factual settings.
136 This argument is developed in Richard H. Pildes, Constitutionalizing Democratic
Politics, in A BADLY FLAWED ELECTION: DEBATING BUSH V. GORE, THE SUPREME COURT,
AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 155 (Ronald Dworkin ed., 2002).
137 See supra Part II.
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One possibility is that it is merely the by-product of shifting judicial coalitions.
On this view, judges have varying instincts about how certain cases should come
out, and also varying preferences concerning the type of explanation that should be
offered for a given result. Preferences over results determine how cases come out,
and the assignment of the opinion determines the type of explanation produced.
This certainly is a partial explanation-Justice Scalia's penchant for formalism is
no secret, 138 nor is Stevens's predilection for open-ended balancing tests.'39 But it is
probably not the whole story. Individual Justices have shifted their approach from
case to case. Consider, for example, Breyer's abandonment of his Randall danger-
signs approach in Crawford and Davis;'40 Thomas and Alito's switch from show-me-
the-evidence in Washington Grange to joining Scalia's denouncing of "record based"
burden analysis in Crawford;"'4 Kennedy's hop-scotching from fact-intensive balanc-
ing in Ldpez Torres, to Scalia's formalism in Washington Grange, then back again to
unmediated balancing in Crawford and roundabout to formal gatekeeping in Davis;142
and Souter's willingness to strike down voting requirements on the basis of specula-
tive harms in Crawford,143 in contrast to the position he has taken in campaign-finance
cases like Randall.'44 Moreover, the notion that the Justices simply "go along" with
the analytic choices made by the author of the principal majority or dissenting opinion
is hard to square with the proliferation of separate concurrences and dissents that one
sees in these and other cases.
Another possibility is that the Court's methodological pluralism is in large mea-
sure the by-product of an unspoken pragmatism in the Justices' thinking about consti-
tutional election law (though this may explain too much). On this view, the Justices'
primary objective in deciding constitutional election law cases is to ensure that the
political process works tolerably well and is accepted by the public as legitimate-
and that the courts' interventions do not sap the judiciary's reputation (in the public
eye) for resolving political disputes in an even-handed manner. A judge possessed of
this overarching sense of purpose could end up "flip flopping" among rule-content
gatekeeping, consequential gatekeeping, and unmediated balancing, depending on the
facts of the case before her and the empirical suppositions she brings to the bench.
Consider L6pez Torres. This was the first case to come before the Court in which a
plaintiff challenged non-electoral facets of a major-party nomination procedure.'45
The Justices were presumably aware that, at the national level at least, the two major
138 See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHi. L. REv. 1175
(1989).
'31 See Siegel, supra note 105.
'" See supra notes 107-08, and accompanying text.
'41 See supra notes 79, 81, 105 and accompanying text.
142 See supra notes 69, 77, 109-110 and accompanying text.
143 See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
'4 See, e.g., Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 231 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting).
14" N.Y. State Bd. of Elections v. L6pez Torres, 128 S. Ct. 791, 795 (2008).
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parties had been continually reworking their nomination procedures-sometimes by
tinkering, sometimes dramatically. The rules governing major party conventions have
not been "sticky" in the face of popular clamoring for change. The Justices were also
aware of the huge range of candidate nomination procedures that the parties have used
in recent memory. 46 Under the circumstances, the Justices may have quite reasonably
concluded that it simply was not a good use of their time to undertake to develop a
new jurisprudence concerning what is an adequately open convention. And the easiest
way to forestall federal court intervention in this area is to pronounce that no standard
exists by which courts may vindicate such claims.
Turn now to Washington Grange.'47 One way of understanding the division be-
tween the majority and the dissenters is in terms of the appropriate judicial response
to a ballot initiative that attempts to sidestep a recent judicial decision. That the voters
of Washington quickly re-enacted a near cousin of the "blanket primary" that the
Supreme Court had held unconstitutional in Jones should give pause to any judge
who takes seriously the idea that constitutional election law should be in service to
democracy, and mindful of public opinion. 48 One way of accommodating the voters'
quick response is to say, in effect, let's not rush to judgment. Let's wait and see
whether the new regime really has the bad effects we fear. If it does, we can under-
take to reform it in due course. And if it does not, so much the better-we will have
let the people of Washington be the authors of their own democracy (and saved our-
selves from a locally discrediting push against the tides of popular opinion).
That said, Scalia's dissenting opinion in Washington Grange can also be under-
stood as an instrumental, calculated response to popular re-enactment of a regime
similar to one the Court had held unconstitutional.14 9 Scalia's approach-allow the
voters to have a "top 2" primary with candidate party-preference designations on the
ballot (the regime the voters had just enacted) provided that the parties are also given
a position on the ballot to denote their acceptance or rejection of the candidates-
avoids a drawn-out conflict between the federal courts and the state's voters. It lays
down a clear path for proponents of the "top 2" model, one that gives them most of
.46 Scalia alluded to this. See id. at 799 ("[T]raditional electoral practice gives no hint of
even the existence, much less the content, of a constitutional requirement for a 'fair shot' at
party nomination.").
,' Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 128 S. Ct. 1184 (2008).
148 The Supreme Court's decision in Jones struck down California's recently enacted blanket
primary, which was modeled on Washington's much older blanket primary. Cal. Democratic
Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567 (2000). Washington's system was challenged soon thereafter,
and was struck down in Democratic Party of Washington State v. Reed, 343 F.3d 1198 (9th
Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1213 (2004). Then in 2004, the voters of Washington adopted
the "top 2" model that was at issue in Washington Grange. Washington Grange, 128 S. Ct.
at 1188-89.
149 Washington Grange, 128 S. Ct. at 1197 (Scalia, J., dissenting). We acknowledge that
one problem with the "pragmatism" explanation for the Court's methodological ambivalence
is that it explains too much.
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what they wanted while also ensuring that the parties have access to the ballot to
communicate their message.
Moreover, one wonders why Scalia's approach did not attract more votes, partic-
ularly given the practice of rule-content gatekeeping in much of the pre-2007 Burdick
jurisprudence. 50 One possibility is that in the present era of intense combat over the
ground rules of electoral competition, some Justices are reluctant to sign on to an
opinion that may be read as authorizing judges simply to declare that this or that elec-
tion law must have a particular feature (or else face strict scrutiny). Even though the
feature insisted on by Scalia was hardly out of the blue in light of Jones, the underlying
power to so insist might be thought too grave to entrust to the lower courts. (Then
again, the gatekeeping rules, once established, should constrain judicial discretion.)'5 '
What about Crawford? At first glance, this is a puzzling case. Like other recently
enacted ID requirements for voting, the Indiana law at issue was the subject of intense
partisan conflict. 152 One might think that this would counsel in favor of a particularly
rigid form of gatekeeping-either formalistic or consequential-as in the partisan
gerrymandering cases. Yet Justices Kennedy and Breyer, who espoused gatekeeping
in the gerrymandering cases, opted for unstructured balancing in Crawford.'53 Hints of
an explanation for this may be found in Kramer v. Union Free School District No.
15,'54 the canonical Warren Court precedent explaining the "fundamental" status of
the right to vote.'55 The right is fundamental, the Court said, because "the legitimacy
of representative government" depends on it. 56 A judge who perceives that the very
legitimacy of the state requires that burdens on the exercise of a favored right be sub-
stantially justified may be willing to take greater institutional risks to protect this right
than others. Unmediated balancing (rather than strict scrutiny) may seem like the
most practicable means for adequately protecting the right vis-A-vis cumbersome ad-
ministrative barriers to its exercise, given (1) the need for pervasive state regulation
to protect the integrity of the voting process, coupled with (2) the incredible diver-
sity of techniques that have been used historically to keep "disfavored" citizens from
voting. 57 Furthermore, if a judge believes, as Kennedy apparently does, that it is
150 See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
'' There is also notable irony in Scalia's enthusiasm for rule-content gatekeeping in
Washington Grange, given his vehement opposition to so-called "prophylactic rules" in other
contexts. See, e.g., Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 450-57 (2000) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (concluding that the Court's establishment of a prophylactic rule against forced
confessions in Miranda v. United States, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), was "an illegitimate exercise
of raw judicial power" (citations omitted)).
152 See Robert Barnes, Partisan Fissures Over Voter ID; Justices to Hear Challenges to
Law, WASH. POST, Dec. 25, 2007, at Al.
13 See supra Part II.C.
"A 395 U.S. 621 (1969).
"5 Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886).
156 Kramer, 395 U.S. at 626.
117 See generally ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE (2000).
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important for the judiciary to be able to intervene post-election to thwart vote-counting
shenanigans,158 a flexible doctrine concerning the right to cast a ballot and have it
counted will be all the more appealing.'59
Other aspects of Crawford also speak to the pragmatic nature of the Justices'
thinking in election law cases. Consider Justice Scalia's rejection of the granular
mode of burden analysis prescribed in Justice Stevens's lead opinion. "6 After can-
vassing the case law going back to Storer to show that the Court had, until Crawford,
assessed the burden of election laws from an aggregative perspective, Scalia remarked:
"Even if I thought that stare decisis did not foreclose adopting an individual-focused
approach, I would reject it as an original matter.' 6' Notably, by "as an original
matter" he did not mean "on originalist grounds." Scalia further explained:
This is an area where the dos and don'ts need to be known in
advance of the election, and voter-by-voter examination of the
burdens of voting regulations would prove especially disruptive.
A case-by-case approach naturally encourages constant litigation.
Very few new election regulations improve everyone's lot, so the
potential allegations of severe burden are endless. A State re-
ducing the number of polling places would be open to the com-
plaint it has violated the rights of disabled voters who live near the
closed stations. Indeed, it may even be the case that some laws
already on the books are especially burdensome for some voters,
and one can predict lawsuits demanding that a State adopt voting
over the Internet or expand absentee balloting. 6 2
This is curious, to say the least, because it is a bedrock principle for Justice Scalia
that the job of the federal courts is to protect the rights of individual litigants, not to
vindicate more general "public interests.' ' 63 In keeping with this, Scalia has in other
158 See, e.g., Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
15' A consequential gatekeeping approach could accommodate both the assumed need for
extensive regulation of the franchise while also giving the courts the ability to respond to many
varieties of voter-thwarting regulations. See Christopher S. Elmendorf, Undue Burdens on
Voter Participation: New Pressuresfora Structural Theory of the Right to Vote?, 35 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 643 (2008). It would not, however, allow the courts to respond promptly to per-
ceived abuses (before the data are clear)-as may be necessary to stop eleventh-hour and post-
election manipulation of the voting process.
16o Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 128 S. Ct. 1610, 1624-27 (2008) (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
161 Id. at 1626.
162 Id.
163 See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the
Separation of Powers, 17 SUFFoLK U. L. REv. 881 (1983).
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contexts railed against the Court's adoption of aggregative legal standards.164 But
when it comes to voting, he evidently thinks that the need for clear rules known in
advance of the election warrants a different approach.' 65
164 Justice Scalia has emerged as "the primary champion of a broad reading" of United
States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987), "in the individual rights context." David L. Franklin,
Facial Challenges, Legislative Purpose, and the Commerce Clause, 92 IOWA L. REv. 41,57
(2006) (citing Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 81-83 (1999) (Scalia, J., dissenting)). Salerno
is a seminal case restricting the availability of facial challenges; some members of the Court,
in contrast to Scalia, have taken the position that facial invalidation is an appropriate remedy
whenever a statute is unconstitutional in a significant number of its applications. Id. at 54-55.
165 Vikram Amar has argued that Justice Scalia's opinion in Crawford is not sui generis
vis-t-vis the rest of Scalia's jurisprudence, but rather coheres with Scalia's seminal opinion
in Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872
(1990), which held that generally applicable laws that burden the exercise of religion do not
violate the free exercise clause unless intended to have that effect. Vikram David Amar, What
the Supreme Court's Recent Decision Upholding Indiana's Voter ID Law Tells Us About the
Court, Beyond the Area of Election Law, FINDLAW'S WRrr, May 8, 2008, http://writ.news
.findlaw.com/amar/20080508.html. In both cases, Amar observes, Scalia rejected constitutional
interpretations that would entitle individuals to an exemption from otherwise benign laws on
the ground that the laws have the incidental effect of substantially burdening the plaintiff's
exercise of a constitutional right. Id. This much is certainly true, and Scalia does cite Smith in
seeking to portray his Crawford opinion as consistent with the main stem of equal protection
jurisprudence.
But Crawford is not really analogous to Smith, in important respects. Crawford, unlike
Smith, involved a law that by its terms was directed to (and interposed a barrier to) the exer-
cise of the constitutionally protected right at issue. And in this context, Scalia did not reject
the proposition that benignly intended "burdens" on the exercise of voting rights can violate
the Constitution. Cf. Smith, 494 U.S. at 878 (emphasizing that the law there at issue was "not
specifically directed at" the plaintiffs religious practice). What we find surprising in his
Crawford opinion is not that Scalia accepted the idea that "burdens alone" (without discrimi-
natory intent) on the right to vote can give rise to strict scrutiny, at least when the burdens result
from a law facially directed at voting, but that he would condition heightened scrutiny on a
showing of society-wide rather than individualized burdens. This is analogous to requiring
a plaintiff-parishioner challenging a zoning ordinance expressly directed at churches to prove
that the ordinance not only substantially burdens the plaintiffs exercise of religion (for
example, by preventing his congregation from building a church on land that they own in the
jurisdiction), but rather that the ordinance substantially interferes with the practice of religion
generally throughout the jurisdiction (which it might not do if most major denominations
already have houses of worship in the jurisdiction). Also analogous would be requiring a
woman who seeks an exemption from a law that expressly bans certain abortion techniques
to show that it substantially impedes access to an abortion for many women, rather than that
it severely burdens her exercise of the abortion right. Cf. Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610,
1638 (2007) (stating that "preenforcement, as-applied challenges" are available "to protect
the health of the woman if it can be shown that in discrete and well-defined instances a
particular condition has or is likely to occur in which the [abortion] procedure prohibited
by the Act must be used").
Incidentally, Scalia's Crawford opinion represents a complete about-face from his
sentiments at oral argument, which in our view better reflect his generally individualistic
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Justice Stevens's Crawford opinion can also be understood as an exercise in
pragmatism, though Stevens, Kennedy, and Roberts evidently saw the risks and re-
wards of their approach somewhat differently than did Scalia. For one, their approach
enabled a "lead opinion" signed by the conservative Chief Justice (Roberts), the
Court's most senior liberal (Stevens), and the Court's swing vote (Kennedy). That
these three Justices spoke with one voice may be seen as an effort to make amends for
the partisan taint of Bush v. Gore,"6 and to signal to the American people that con-
stitutional election law is not just partisan politics in another guise. 167 The substance
of their approach-setting a very high bar for facial challenges, while inviting as-
applied claims by individual plaintiffs who seek an exemption or other accommoda-
tion can also be defended on pragmatic grounds. Though it may yet engender much
litigation as Scalia warned, this model does discourage courts from second-guessing
the overall reasonableness of controversial legislative enactments (reducing the risk
of judicial conflict with the party-in-government), and it may help to lower the stakes
of voting rights litigation (which, one might hope, will in turn reduce the likelihood
that judges' partisan preferences will influence their decisions).
Before concluding, let us revisit Davis v. Federal Election Commission, the last
member of the election law quartet from October Term 2007.'68 Here, the Court's con-
servative majority was of one mind in applying strict scrutiny to an asymmetric cam-
paign contribution limit, seemingly because it was asymmetric. 69 Washington Grange
notwithstanding, neither Thomas, Alito, nor Roberts took the position that a candi-
date in Jack Davis's shoes could win a constitutional challenge to the Millionaire's
Amendment only by proving that the fund-raising advantage that the BCRA conveyed
on his opponent severely impeded his ability to convey his message to the electorate. 7 '
Why not require the plaintiff-candidate to prove that his opponent's BCRA-enabled
spending resulted in "widespread voter confusion" about the plaintiff-candidate's
message? A pragmatic judge might reason that proving such an effect is simply too
difficult-there are too many imponderables. One who undertook to identify this effect
would have to make value-laden judgment calls about what the plaintiff-candidate's
"true" (and no doubt multi-dimensional) message is, and about how to measure and
quantify "misperceptions." She would also have to figure out whether the mispercep-
tions result from spending by the candidate's opponent, and then isolate the amount
jurisprudential instincts. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 34-39, Crawford, 128 S. Ct.
1610 (Nos. 07-21, 07-25). (Note especially Scalia's suggestion at oral argument that if "one
half of one percent" of the electorate finds the ID requirement substantially burdensome, those
voters would "have a cause of action to say you can't apply it to me." Id. at 35.)
'66 Barnes, supra note 152.
167 Edward B. Foley, Crawford and the Amicus Court: Further Supportfor a Non-Partisan
Advisory Tribunal, ELECTION LAW @ MoRrTz, Apr. 29, 2008, http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/
electionlaw/comments/articles.php?ID=413.
161 128 S. Ct. 2759 (2008).
69 Id. at 2765-75.
170 Id.
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of spending attributable to the Millionaire's Amendment and its corresponding impact
on voter misperceptions of the plaintiff-candidate. This is a vastly more complicated
undertaking than surveying voters to learn whether they (mistakenly) believe that the
"party preference designation" on the Washington state ballot represents an endorse-
ment of the candidate by the party, or whether they (correctly) believe that it is simply
a statement by the candidate of the party that she or he prefers. Given the difficulty
of identifying and isolating the consequences of the Millionaire's Amendment, the
prudent course for a judge concerned about incumbency-protecting regulation of cam-
paign finance may be to apply strict scrutiny to any campaign finance restriction that
does not apply symmetrically to both of the candidates in a race. To be sure, by tying
strict scrutiny to a qualitative feature of the law, the Court creates some space for ad-
venturesome interventions by lower courts that deem other qualitative features sus-
pect. But the conservative Justices might well consider this a welcome development
in the campaign finance context, even if some (by the looks of Washington Grange)
still remain reluctant to license the construction of new rule-content gatekeeping tests
in the party-rights context.1
7 1
CONCLUSION
In the early 1970s, the Supreme Court faced up to the pervasively regulated
character of the electoral process and announced that the mere fact that a state law
burdens the exercise of political rights does not give rise to a presumption of uncon-
stitutionality. 172 The Storer Court prescribed a cautious approach, calling on lower
courts to balance interests and make "hard judgments" about whether the requirements
at issue in any given case go too far.173 Over the next thirty-plus years, however, the
Supreme Court often proceeded, not by fact-intensive balancing on a case-by-case
basis, but by drawing facial distinctions among election regulations and then applying
strict scrutiny or lax, rational-basis-like review.
174
October Term 2007 unsettled this body of law. Even as the Court confirmed the
Storer-Burdick framework's very broad reach-it now seems to cover essentially all
aspects of the electoral process except for the design of electoral districts-the Court
dispatched any notion that the framework has a unifying methodology.'75 Absent a
Supreme Court precedent squarely on point, it is now open to a lower court working
within this framework (1) to engage in unmediated, all-things-considered balancing,
focusing either on the overall reasonableness of the challenged law or on the reason-
ableness of exempting or otherwise accommodating the plaintiff or plaintiff-class;
'71 See supra notes 79-83 and accompanying text.
'72 See Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 730 (1974).
173 Id.
174 The two-tiered character of judicial review in Storer's domain first received official
recognition in Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428 (1992). See also supra Part I.
171 See supra Part II.
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(2) to apply strict scrutiny after determining that the law (relative to some practicable
alternative) has a large, demonstrable adverse impact on voting, political association,
or the competitiveness of campaigns; (3) to apply strict scrutiny after identifying a
facial attribute of the law itself that renders it suspect in the judge's eye; (4) to apply
extremely deferential review because the law does not have attributes that the judge
deems facially suspect and because the judge is leery of getting bogged down in em-
pirical debates or indulging in the guess work of open-ended balancing; or (5) to reject
the plaintiff's claim after positing that it raises questions about democratic fairness
concerning which there is no discemable historical consensus.'76
Our tentative view is that this methodological pluralism, coupled with a lack of
explicit normative direction, tends to suggest that most Justices (even Scalia) approach
constitutional election law thinking less about doctrinal coherence or interpretive
principle than about the implications of their rulings for the system of government
as a whole. The Justices sense that constitutional adjudication has an important role
to play in legitimating the ground rules of electoral competition, notwithstanding that
the text of the Constitution and conventional historical sources do very little to de-
fine the scope of political rights. But the Justices also continue to hear Frankfurter's
admonition against entanglement in partisan conflict, and Storer's caution against
inferring a presumption of unconstitutionality simply because a political right has
been burdened by an election law. How these competing considerations shake out
varies from Justice to Justice and context to context, depending not only on the indi-
vidual Justice's confidence in the likelihood that other judges will apply open-ended
balancing tests in a sensible, nonpartisan fashion, but also upon, inter alia, the Justice's
sense of the importance of the issue before the court; of the existence (or lack thereof)
of plausible qualitative criteria for classifying the requirement as presumptively consti-
tutional or unconstitutional; of the likelihood that plaintiffs would be able to adduce
and judges to assimilate relevant empirical evidence should the court opt instead for
consequential gatekeeping; and of the need to accommodate popular sentiments (par-
ticularly if the law at issue was enacted by referendum and responds to a previous
constitutional ruling).'
Insofar as constitutional election law consists of intricate pragmatic judgments
meant to encourage public acceptance of both the electoral process and the Court's
own supervisory role, it is fair to ask whether this endeavor should be carried out--or
even whether it can be carried out-by ordinary Article I courts acting on judicial
hunches. These questions seem to us especially pressing in light of Crawford, the
Court's first voting administration case since Bush v. Gore and one whose subject
(like that in Bush) was an intensely partisan battle. 78 Surely the Justices did not want
to appear as if they each were voting in Crawford according to their own political
176 See generally supra Part II.
177 See supra Part II.
178 See Barnes, supra note 152.
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preferences, rather than as required by constitutional dictates they are bound to uphold.
Yet the highly fragmented outcome in Crawford, and the intense methodological
disagreement that accompanied it, only exacerbated the perception that the Court is
literally lawless-without any law for it to follow-when deciding election cases.
The ship needs a new compass, and we need to better understand why-despite
its own episodic recognition of this need-the Court has been unable to procure one
for itself. In this essay, we have taken some initial steps in an effort to understand the
Court's uncertain bearings.
